This paper assesses the spillover e↵ect of European Patent Boxes on a liates of MNEs operating in Austria and Germany.
Introduction
Intellectual property (IP) is widely seen as an increasingly important driver of prosperity and policy-makers have implemented ambitious programs aimed at strengthening the Knowledge Based Economy and the creation of Knowledge Based Capital (OECD (2013) ). With IP being highly mobile -both its development and, often more relevant, its ownership are a central element of tax planning strategies in multinational enterprises ) -its attraction and promotion is an area of global tax competition.
Whether this competition is desirable is a matter of debate; Concerns about a downward race to the bottom eroding tax bases (OECD (2014)) can be countered by a case for restricting competition to areas with the highest mobility in order to limit distortions to the general tax regime (Keen (2001) ). In practice, the desirability of innovation-based business activity has triggered the development of a range of tailored tax policy tools to encourage investments and/or the relocation of intangible assets.
Over the past decades, countries have typically employed Research and Development (R&D) incentives aimed at promoting the creation of intangibles. A broad literature assesses the e↵ectiveness of such instruments in di↵erent contexts, suggesting that there are sizable e↵ects for tax allowances or credits in encouraging R&D (Bloom et al. (2002) ; Hall and Van Reenen (2000) ).
More recently, several countries have introduced preferential IP regimes, labeled as Patent Boxes, which o↵er reduced tax rates for income that firms declare to be derived from patents and, in some cases, other forms of IP. As opposed to targeting research, these new policy tools aim at the income stemming from the commercialization of IP. Less is known on the e↵ectiveness of IP regimes. Investigating general e↵ects of low patent income tax rates on IP location, Dischinger and Riedel (2011) find that intangible asset holdings are distorted towards low-tax subsidiaries in multinational groups. They look at di↵erences in the statutory tax rates of a liates across an MNE group, and account for patent box regimes by lowering the assumed corporate income tax rate operating in countries with preferential regimes. Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) ) and Gri th, Miller and OConnell (2014) show that patent registration is sensitive to corporate tax rates. Ernst, Richter and Riedel (2014) report that jurisdictions with lower tax rates attract patent applications of higher quality and corresponding revenue streams. Looking at European firms, Boehm, Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) demonstrate that a significant share of patent applications in low tax countries such as Ireland and Switzerland have been developed abroad. Focusing directly on the introduction of Patent Boxes in European Countries, demonstrate that preferential IP regimes substantially reduce e↵ective tax burdens, with the treatment of expenses and definition and determination of eligible income having similar importance as the nominal tax rates being o↵ered. They conclude that while a Patent Box may attract mobile investment, these regimes tend to be poorly targeted at encouraging additional investment activity. In a simulation exercise, Gri th et al. (2014) estimate country specific semi-elasticities of patent applications to income taxation and provide approximations of the e↵ect of patent box regimes introduced in Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and the UK. They find that the expected increase in patent ownership is insu cient to o↵set revenue losses stemming from preferential tax treatment.
This paper aims to add to this emerging body of work by using a di↵erent analytical perspective and approach in investigating the e↵ect of preferential IP regimes in Europe. Rather than measuring the e↵ect of preferential regimes on the tax base and stock of intangible assets located in the place of the policy innovation, I focus on the e↵ect of patent boxes on firms operating in two European countries without preferential treatment for IP, Germany and Austria. Relying on a di↵erence-indi↵erences framework to compare German and Austrian multinational subsidiaries with related entities in countries that have introduced IP Regimes to those who have no such a liates, I find evidence of reduced reported pre-tax profit levels among both Austrian and German firms, which have access to newly introduced Patent Boxes abroad through an a liated party. I do not, however, find evidence of the relocation of intangible assets among these subsidiaries, possibly due to legal restrictions. These initial findings point towards two intriguing dynamics that warrant further investigation. First, they provide some support to concerns on potential tax base spillovers in international corporate taxation (IMF (2014) ) in the case of preferential IP taxation. Second, short-term MNE tax planning in response to preferential IP regimes may be more reliant on manipulating value estimates and associated license and royalty payments, than on the transfer of legal ownership rights.
Background & Motivation
Currently, 12 European countries operate a preferential regime for income from Intellectual Property, 1 with discussions on a possible introduction ongoing in several others. The typical stated objective for these policies is to ensure that a country remains an attractive destination for innovative activities, linked to high skilled jobs driving technological innovation and growth.
2 The spread of similar regimes across Europe since the early 2000s also suggests a competitive dynamic among countries. The specifics of IP regimes di↵er across a range of important design elements, a↵ecting the attractiveness of regimes to stimulate the development of new IP, as well as a regime's pull for the relocation of existing assets. Irrespective of the relative focus of a regime, there is, however, a common concern that positive e↵ects of attracting IP from a receiving country's perspective come at the expense of other countries losing some of their R&D activities, ownership, and returns.
MNEs can use cross-border tax planning strategies to take advantage of benefits of preferential regimes in any of the countries where they are active. 3 Evers and Spengel (2014) discuss di↵erent routes for tax planning involving intangible assets. Di↵erentiating the development and ownership of IP assets can be achieved by allocating IP to holding companies in low tax jurisdiction in a direct transfer of ownership or by using contract R&D arrangements. Alternatively, licensing arrangements often provide room for allocating profits to low tax jurisdictions. From an MNE perspective, maximizing the share of income accruing in a patent box jurisdiction ensures a higher after tax return. At the same time, the costs of intangible asset creation should ideally be located in a high tax jurisdiction, unless they need to be collocated to ensure that income is eligible for preferential treatment.
4 Consequently, a range of MNE responses to the introduction of patent boxes abroad could be expected. These include changes (i.) in the pricing strategy to remunerate a liated owners of intangibles through higher license and royalty payments by subsidiaries not benefiting from preferential treatment; (ii.) alterations to the total level of investment in R&D, with expected increases given higher after tax returns; and (iii.) adjustments to the allocation of investments (given that the share of intangible inputs is mobile). This paper is a first attempt to assess the impact, or spillover, of such strategies on a liates operating in Austria and Germany.
Sample selection & descriptives
I obtain firm-level micro data of German and Austrian MNE a liates from the OR-BIS database, compiled, standardized, and commercially o↵ered by Bureau Van Dijk (BvD). Selecting German and Austrian firms with unconsolidated accounts, I extract financial information on these firms as well as details on the location of all a liated companies, i.e. subsidiaries and immediate parents as well as on the ultimate owner. About 84 percent of the firms in the sample are based in Germany, and 16 percent located in Austria. A visual depiction of the distribution of observations across industries (using the first and second NACE code digits) shows a fairly similar spread in both countries. I extract the following firm level variables reported in ORBIS: EBIT, intangible assets, 5 fixed assets, and turnover during the time period from 2005-2011, providing The majority of a liates in the sample operate in the trade (32%) and manufacturing (22%) sectors.
seven years of firm specific information. My data set consists of a total of 8,203 firms, after removing a liates with poor data. About 13.3 percent of the firms in my sample have access to a patent box regime through a subsidiary, immediate parent, or the ultimate owner. A total of 4260 observations fall into the treatment category following the introduction of a preferential regime in an a liate's jurisdiction. Overall, subsidiaries with a liates located in countries where patent boxes have been introduced posted higher profit levels in Germany and, to a lesser extend, Austria. The peak in absolute levels is around 2007-2008, before the onset of the financial crisis. The distribution of EBIT and Intangible Assets is, however, considerably skewed and has thick tails. Following a transformation using the natural logarithm of EBIT, broadly similar trends can be observed.
6
expenses with a long-term e↵ect.
6 Negative entries for fixed assets, intangible asset and turnover. I also drop one outlier with no reported assets, sta↵ or subsidiaries in any year of my sample and a single EBIT entry of more than 22 Billion Euro in 2011. Corresponding to the higher level of reported profits, the overall stock of intangible assets among firms with a liates in Patent Box countries tends to be higher than for other MNE subsidiaries operating in Germany and at comparable levels in Austria. The ratio of intangible to fixed assets is, however, noticeably lower among these Austrian firms during the timeframe of the analysis. 
Estimation approach
To estimate the spill-over e↵ect of Patent Box introductions in the late-2000s on MNE operations in Austria and Germany, I rely on a Di↵erences-in-Di↵erences (DD) framework, comparing Austrian and German MNE group members that have related entities in countries with newly introduced IP regimes to Austrian and German subsidiaries without a liates in these countries.
I first identify subsidiaries with a liates in Belgium, the Netherlands, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Malta, Cyprus, and Spain, and then create an interaction with the years following the introduction of a patent box in each country. This dummy variable always takes the value of one when a firm has access to another subsidiary, immediate parent, or ultimate owner with a patent box that was introduced during the time frame captured in the panel. If, for example, a subsidiary in my sample has an a liate in Belgium or the Netherlands, the dummy takes the value of one from 2007 onwards. In the case of companies operating with related entities in Spain or Luxemburg, the same holds for the years from 2008 onwards. In cases where a German or Austrian entity has a subsidiary in Belgium and Spain, the dummy captures the earlier regime's introduction. Figure 4 below illustrates the division of companies into treatment and control groups based on the year when a Patent Box was introduced. The idea of the DD method is to control for factors that are constant over time among the companies that are operating in countriesthat have introduced a new regime during the timeframe captured in the panel, 7 and to compare changes in their intangible assets and reported profits to a comparison group of firms without a liates operating in these countries. A basic assumption for the DD design is thus that these outcomes would follow an equal trend for both types of firms in the absence of the introduction of IP regimes.
The intuitiveness of a DD approach and its quasi-experimental nature come at the cost of a lack in precision. In light of the important di↵erences in scope and attractiveness of these regimes ), the integration of all firms with a liates across the di↵erent countries that have introduced Patent Box regimes is a rather blunt approximation. It does, however, provide an interesting starting point to assess spill-over e↵ects on a more granular basis. Integrating fixed e↵ects estimators, the approach allows me to control for observable and unobservable time-invariant characteristics in the two sets of companies. Adding year dummies captures time shocks a↵ecting all German and Austrian firms in the sample.
In my baseline regression, I estimate the following OLS model:
Subscripts i and t indicate the firm and the time period (year), Y it being the logarithmic transformation of EBIT and intangible assets 8 . I adopt firm fixed e↵ects µ i , to control for non-observable characteristics at the firm level that are constant over time, 9 and year fixed e↵ects ⌧ t . For additional estimations, I add a vector of firm level control variables X (turnover, fixed assets) to the regression specification (1).
7 Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Liechtenstein, Spain, Malta and Cyprus. 8 Since the distribution for the two dependent variables Intangible Assets and EBIT is noticeably skewed, I employ a logarithmic transformation of both variables. Following previous work (Dischinger and Riedel (2011) ), I add a constant of 1 to the intangibles variable in order to keep zero-observations in the sample.
9 A Hausman test suggests that a fixed e↵ects approach is preferable to random e↵ects.
The standalone e↵ect of PBaccess is constant over time and thus captured by the firm-specific fixed e↵ects. My main interest is in the sign and significance of the 1 parameters, which can be interpreted as a di↵erence-in-di↵erences estimator as illustrated below:
Define P Baccess ⇤ P ostIntro = D; and the expected change in EBIT/IntAssets of subsidiary i, which has access to a Patent Box in year t by:
Similarly define the di↵erence for subsidiary j, which does not have access through a subsidiary in a Patent Box Country by:
Substracting shows that 1 indicates the di↵erence between those changes:
5 Results Table 3 shows the results of the estimation of baseline equation (1), with the logarithm of EBIT as dependent variable. The variable PBa*postIntro captures indirect e↵ects of Patent Box regimes on Austrian subsidiaries and the combination of PBa*postIntro and the interaction PBa*postIntroDE the same e↵ect on German companies. The first specification is a pure baseline, indicating a significant negative e↵ect of indirect patent box access on reported profits in Austria and Germany. In the second specification, the reported turnover and fixed assets are added as firm level controls. Both factors are significant in explaining reported profit (intangible asset) levels, and are therefore maintained for the following specifications. The results of the first and second specification suggest that reported profits fall by around 22%-28% in Austria among subsidiaries that gain indirect access to a Patent Box. In Germany, the observed e↵ect ranges between 7%-9%.
10 The elasticity of EBIT with respect to Fixed Assets captured by the coe cient lFixedAssets suggests that a 10 percent increase in Fixed Assets increases EBIT by 0.3%, when turnover is held constant. Increasing Turnover by 10% increases EBIT by 8.3%, assuming everything else remains equal. In the third (fourth) specification, I interact dummy variables taking the value of 1 if a subsidiary has a domestic ultimate owner (owns at least one patent) with my PBa*postIntro variable. In both cases, I find no significant e↵ects. Finally, I rerun specification (2) after dropping all a liates belonging to a comparatively small MNE group with 20 or less firms. Results remain largely unchanged. In all of my specifications I rely on robust standard errors, allowing for a general correlation structure within firms. Using a similar set of specifications and the logarithmic transformation of intangibles as a dependent variable (Table 4) , I find no significant e↵ect of Patent Box access on the intangible asset endowment of Austrian and German subsidiaries. 
Interpretation
My findings provide some support to concerns about potential negative spillovers of preferential IP-Regimes in Europe. While I do find significant negative e↵ects of indirect patent box access on reported profit levels, I do not observe an e↵ect on intangible asset holdings among Austrian and German subsidiaries following the introduction of Patent Boxes abroad. The latter observation might be partly linked to legal restrictions on asset relocations. In many cases, there are non-negligible tax costs resulting from ownership transfers. Where exit taxes apply, the net present value of an asset needs to be calculated based on a benchmark below true market value to obtain a favorable overall situation from an MNEs perspective. Relocating intangible assets through direct sales may thus often be a sub-optimal strategy, particularly when there is potential for exit taxation.
11 A more remunerating approach might be a gradual transfer of ownership: registration of new patents in low tax Countries and reliance on contract R&D, with the taxpayer in a low tax jurisdiction taking the formal risk of the development, thus ensuring that income qualifies for preferential treatment (see ). Böhm et al. (2012) , for instance, find that 8% of patent applications at the European Patent O ce have a di↵erent inventor and applicant origin. Such strategies result in a gradual re-allocation of intangible assets and are thus unlikely to be picked up in the panel I have assembled. Moreover, firms are likely most sensible to corporate tax rates with respect to the IP that has the highest earnings potential. It is thus probable that the quality of IP is critical in understanding e↵ects (Böhm et al. (2012) ). The lack of di↵erentiation when using the balance sheet item intangible assets in this study may therefore be too general to capture e↵ects on intangible asset endowments of subsidiaries in Austria and Germany.
To take advantage of preferential tax rates in Patent Box jurisdictions, a fruitful short-term strategy may be the overvaluation of assets that are already located in these jurisdictions. This seems plausible, given that intangible assets have been identified as an important driver of observable profit shifting (Beer and Loeprick (2014) ). Tax administrators often highlight related party royalty flows among key profit-shifting risk areas.
12 Licensing arrangements may thus provide room for allocating profits into IP-Box jurisdictions without transferring legal ownership. Such behavior could explain the finding of a significant reduction in reported profit levels among a liates, in particular in Austria, when they obtain indirect access to preferential IP regimes. Consequently, there seems to be some scope for administrative mitigation measures in Austria to enforce the proper valuation of intangible assets held abroad.
Di↵erences in the observed country e↵ects may be due to a broad range of factors, including the legal framework, available administrative resources, and di↵erences in the composition of value chains in Austria and Germany. Notably, German authorities have been more proactive in introducing anti-avoidance provisions. For instance, German CFC rules are among the oldest globally, 13 whereas Austria has not yet intro-duced similar provisions. Germany has also introduced strict regulations regarding the transfer of intangible assets in 2008.
14

Conclusion
Policy innovations to encourage R&D investments and attract intangible assets have drawn a lot of attention in recent debates on potentially harmful tax competition in the EU. This paper provides initial analysis investigating potential spillover e↵ects of preferential IP regimes in Europe. Instead of measuring the e↵ect of preferential regimes on the tax base and stock of intangible assets located in countries that have introduced Patent Boxes, I assess the e↵ect of new patent box regimes on a liates operating in Germany and Austria. The results of a di↵erence-in-di↵erences framework indicate a reduction in reported pre-tax profitability levels among Austrian and German firms. I do not, however, find significant evidence of the relocation of intangible assets among these firms. These findings suggest that MNE tax planning in response to preferential IP regimes may be more reliant on manipulating the value estimates and associated license and royalty payments, rather than on the transfer of legal ownership rights. There is thus some scope for administrative mitigation measures in enforcing proper valuation of intangible assets held abroad.
